The overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya was a major strategic error and an “immoral” mistake, according to a new book by a French former secret service agent. Jean-Francois Lhuillier, who served France’s Directorate General for External Security (DGSE) for 27 years, including as Tripoli station chief, describes the decision by then-President Nicolas Sarkozy to back rebel groups as “disastrous.” Lhuillier argues that the consequences of this decision were not foreseen and that it was incomprehensible for Sarkozy to want Gaddafi’s scalp.
Lhuillier’s book, titled “The Tripoli Man: Memoirs of a Secret Agent,” reveals that members of the French and Libyan governments had close links before Gaddafi’s fall. Sarkozy himself was indicted for receiving money from Gaddafi for political campaigning in 2007. Lhuillier also claims that DGSE agents were working with Libyan rebel groups, and UK Special Air Service personnel were on the ground in Libya as well.
One incident cited in the book involves a Scottish operative known as “Pierce” asking Lhuillier to provide the whereabouts of DGSE operatives in Libya to coordinate operations with the SAS. Lhuillier was unaware of either group’s presence in the country at the time. This revelation highlights the lack of coordination and communication between different intelligence agencies involved in the operation.
Lhuillier criticizes the decision to eliminate Gaddafi, arguing that his regime served as a rampart against Islamist terrorism. The consequences of this disastrous expedition were not foreseen, and it was immoral to destroy his country without considering the potential ramifications. Lhuillier believes that Sarkozy’s desire for Gaddafi’s scalp clouded his judgment and led to a series of disastrous outcomes.
The book also sheds light on the relationship between the DGSE and its British counterparts. Lhuillier claims that the DGSE was frequently out-thought and out-maneuvered by the UK intelligence agencies. He recounts an incident where the head of the DGSE flew to Tunisia in an attempt to get Libya’s foreign minister, Moussa Koussa, to defect, only to discover that he had already defected to London. Lhuillier suggests that the British must have made a more generous offer, highlighting the lack of coordination and cooperation between the French and British intelligence agencies.
Lhuillier’s book also reflects on the decline of the DGSE’s military effectiveness and values since it was opened up to civilian command in 1985. He argues that the sinking of the Greenpeace vessel Rainbow Warrior by DGSE operatives off the coast of New Zealand led to a loss of military effectiveness and values within the organization. Lhuillier laments that the DGSE has become less effective and less focused on its core mission since that incident.
In response to the publication of this book, the DGSE issued a statement condemning former members for breaking their oath of secrecy and damaging the institution. The DGSE argues that by publishing such works, former members are undermining the integrity and reputation of the organization.
Overall, Lhuillier’s book provides a critical perspective on the decision to overthrow Gaddafi in Libya. It highlights the lack of coordination and communication between different intelligence agencies involved in the operation and questions the moral implications of destroying a country without considering the potential consequences. The book also raises concerns about the decline of the DGSE’s military effectiveness and values since it was opened up to civilian command. This publication serves as a reminder of the complexities and challenges involved in international interventions and the need for careful consideration of potential outcomes.